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Abstract—Telecom infrastructures are facing unprecedented 
challenges with increasing demands on network capacity. Next 
Generation Networks (NGN) allows consumers to choose 
between different access network technologies to access their 
service environment. The arrival of NGAN (Next Generation 
Access Network) has implications for the competitive 
conditions in access markets that are still uncertain (for 
example: access to ducts, dark fiber, equipment, etc.). The 
definition of the access price is a critical question, particularly 
when the incumbent also has activity in the retail market. In 
some regions, the regulatory authorities need to define the max 
price for wholesale access. In this context, the paper is divided 
into two main parts: 1) First we make a review of the main 
broadband access technologies (NGANs), and we propose a 
techno-economic model to support the new requirements of 
fixed and nomadic users. 2) In the 2nd part we propose a tool, 
developed in c language, which simulates the impact of retail 
and wholesale services prices variation in the provider’s profit, 
consumer surplus, welfare, etc.  
Next Generation Networks, Next Generation Access 
Networks, Geographical Segmentation, Segmented Regulation, 
Nash Equilibrium 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The move towards Next Generation Networks (NGN) 
has begun to transform the telecommunication sector from 
distinct single service markets into converging markets [1]. 
Telecom infrastructures are facing unprecedented challenges, 
with increasing demands on network capacity. NGN allows 
consumers to choose between different access network 
technologies to access their service environment. In our 
work, the architecture of NGN will be limited to the current 
and future developments of network architectures in the 
access network (local loop), called Next Generation Access 
Network (NGAN). The NGAN can use technologies as fiber, 
copper utilizing digital subscriber line (xDSL) technologies, 
coaxial cable, powerline communications, wireless solutions 
or hybrid deployment of these technologies (Figure 1).  
The choice of a specific technology for NGAN can be 
different between countries, geographic areas and operators. 
In recent years there has been an increase in the number, 
coverage and market share of “alternative” networks or 
operators such as resellers, unbundling operators, cable 
network operators, operators using frequencies for Wireless 
local loop (WLL), or operators deploying optical fiber in the 
local loop [2]. This has resulted in differences in competitive 
conditions between geographic areas, and this, in turn, has 
led to increasing argument (especially from incumbent 
operators) that geographical aspects be recognized in 
market/competition analysis and in regulatory decisions. 
There are several factors that can be responsible for this 
discrepancy [3]: state and age of the existing network 
infrastructure, length of local loop, population density and 
structure of the housing market, distribution of number of 
users and number of street cabinets for Local Exchange, 
level of intermodal competition in the market, willingness to 
pay for broadband services and the existence of ad hoc 
national government plans for broadband development. 
The arrival of NGAN has implications for the 
competitive conditions in access markets that are still 
uncertain, including the role of bitstream, Sub-Loop 
Unbundling (SLU) access to ducts, etc. However, operator’s 
investments in networks face different types of uncertainties. 
For example, when the incumbent operator has the monopoly 
in the access network and, simultaneous, has activity in retail 
market, the price regulation is an important question. 
Without price access regulation the incumbent can use his 
power in the market to stop or hamper the entrance of new 
operator in the retail market. However, if regulatory 
authority makes a very rigid control of the access price may 
reduce the incentive of the incumbent to make investments in 
the network. The regulatory authority should not increase 
uncertainties and has to provide clear incentives and 
guidance for the investment required for deploying NGANs 
[4]. Regulators should ensure that Local Loop Unbundling 
(LLU) and SLU, bitstream, the transition to NGAN, access 
to ducts and dark fiber, inside (building) wiring, collocation, 
and backhaul are defined in a transparent, efficient, and 
technologically neutral manner [2]. Segmented regulation 
has been identified as a regulatory framework that can 
potentially provide both incentives and controls for the 
deployment of NGNs [5]. 
Regulatory authorities in most OECD countries have 
traditionally adopted a national geographic area focus when 
framing the geographic scope of telecommunications 
markets [2]. The increase in the number, coverage and 
market share of new networks or operators has resulted in 
differences in competitive conditions between geographic 
areas. Results from market analysis economics suggest that 
differential regulation be considered between geographic 
areas where facility-based competition has developed and 
where it has not.  
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Figure 1.  NGAN architectures (Block diagram) [6] 
Competition can be promoted at many levels and 
locations through contestability and innovation [7]. After the 
decision of several countries to implement geographic 
regulation, the interest in these questions has been an 
increase. In the literature on the regulation of future access 
networks the discussion on regulation and investment has 
gained center stage given the pending infrastructure 
investments in many countries [1]. The geographically 
segmented regulation should aim not only at facilitating 
deregulation but also at strengthening regulation in those 
regions where competition is assessed to be ineffective. 
Then, segmented regulation can assist regulators to ensure 
that the regulatory framework they apply is appropriately 
tailored to the competition situation [2]. Local decisions of a 
national regulator may lead to inefficiencies deriving from 
discrepancies between local and global cost-benefit 
evolutions [8]. Segmented regulation may be helpful because 
it allows different solutions for the deployment of NGNs in 
urban and rural areas to evolve at different paces [5] 
Figure 2 illustrates a scenario of the differences in 
competitive circumstances that may warrant geographically 
segmented regulation. There are geographical differences in 
conditions of competition: number of suppliers, market 
shares, etc. [9]. 
The deregulation of high-density areas may avoid 
unnecessary protection of access-based competitors and 
strengthen incentives to invest in infrastructure, and that 
maintaining regulation of low-density areas may promote 
competition with national offers, because alternative 
operators are enabled to extend geographical coverage 
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Figure 2.  Geographically segmented regulation [9] 
The analysis of some regulatory inquiries [1, 2, 7] on the 
national level shows that access providers (usually the 
incumbent operators – the former monopoly operators) are 
generally in favour of geographic differentiation. For 
example: the Spanish operator (Telefonica) claims that (see 
[2]) “…the geographical segmentation model will push 
investments and gradual deregulation and users will always 
enjoy the best possible scenario, either with a sustained or a 
regulatory supervised market…Differentiated regulation 
would prevent the increase of the digital divide.” In 
Australia, Telstra argued that geographically segmented 
regulation (see [2]): “…will promote competition by giving 
service providers the appropriate incentives to use and 
extend alternative infrastructure, and will also promote 
competition in the upstream local services market by 
encouraging other carriers to offer wholesale local services.” 
In case of consumers, the geographic differentiation 
impact has an important consideration especially in view of 
the often-repeated statements by politicians and regulators 
that policy and regulation are designed to be in the long-term 
interest of consumers [1]. For business users, the breakup of 
market analysis to sub-national level is a source of 
significant alarm, especially concerning wholesale 
broadband access services. For multinational business users, 
inconsistency of national regulations, and a consequent 
inability to obtain seamless international network services 
without service quality, costs and administrative 
disadvantages, is already a serious problem. 
II. A TECHNO-ECONOMIC MODEL FOR BROADBAND 
ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES 
A. Overview 
In this part we present the economics of next generation 
access networks, focusing on several broadband access 
technologies (fiber to the home - FTTH, DSL, hybrid fiber-
cable - HFC, power line communication - PLC and 
worldwide interoperability for microwave access - WiMAX) 
and propose a techno-economic model to support the new 
requirements of fixed and nomadic users.  
We present an economic model designing and deploying 
access networks for both fixed and mobile users. The type of 
networks for fixed users includes, FTTH, DSL, HFC, PLC, 
while the nomadic user is assumed to use WiMAX. This 
model could serve as a good starting tool for the design of 
access networks, as it includes all the major capital expenses 
involved in the deployment of access networks such as 
equipment costs, installation costs, etc. The costs resulting 
for our model is grouped into 3 main categories: A) 
Infrastructures: in our work we subdivide this category in 2: 
civil works (trenching and ducting) and cable costs (cost of 
the fiber and cost to pass the cable in the ducts). As we can 
see in Figure 1, in all solutions the fiber costs are necessary 
to connect central office to the street cabinet. Normally, this 
is the category that has more costs, depending on the 
existence/share of an infrastructure. This means that if an 
operator has the infrastructure (or part), the costs can be 
lower. B) Equipment: includes the costs such as optical 
network unit (ONU), optical line termination (OLT) ports 
and chassis, splitters, digital subscriber line access 
multiplexer (DSLAM), etc. Also includes the cost of street 
cabinets and the equipment installation costs. C) Customer 
Premises Equipment: includes the modem and other 
electronics – like splitters. For FTTH architecture includes 
the ONU equipment. 
B. Description 
The proposed model considers that in the static layer, 
users are stationary and normally require data, voice, and 
video quality services (these subscribers demand great 
bandwidth). In the nomadic layer (or mobility layer), the 
main concern is mobility and normally the required 
bandwidth is smaller than in the static layer. The focus of the 
wireless networks was to support mobility and flexibility, 
while for the wired access networks is bandwidth and high 
QoS. However, with the advances in technology, wireless 
solutions such as WiMAX have capacity to provide 
wideband and high QoS services and in this way competing 
with wired technologies [10]. Then, we propose a new model 
to support the new needs of the access networks: bandwidth 
and mobility (see Figure 3). 
For the nomadic layer we chose the WiMAX solutions. 
This technology enables long distance wireless connections 
with speeds up to 75 Mbps per second. WiMAX can be used 
for a number of applications, including "last mile" broadband 
connections, hotspot and cellular backhaul and high-speed 
enterprise connectivity for businesses. This technology can 
offer very high data rates and extended coverage.  
As we can see in Figure 4, the framework is separated 
into three main layers [12]: (Layer 1) First, we identify for 
each sub-area the total households and SMEs (Static 
analysis), and total nomadic users (Mobility analysis).The 
proposed model initially separates these two components 
because they have different characteristics. (Layer 2) In this 
layer, it is analyzed the best technology, for each Access 
Network, the static and nomadic component. For the static 
analysis we consider the following technologies: FTTH-PON 
(passive optical networks), DSL, HFC, and WiMAX PLC. 
To the nomadic analysis we use the WiMAX technology. 
Then, the final result of this layer is the best technological 
solution to support the different needs (Static and nomadic). 
The selection of the best option is based in four output 
results: NPV, IRR, Cost per subscriber in year 1, and Cost 
per subscriber in year n. (Layer 3) The next step is to create a 
single infrastructure that supports the two components. To 
this end, is necessary the analysis of the best solution (based 
on NPV, IRR, etc.) for each Access Network. Then, for each 
sub-area we verify if the best solution is: a) the wired 
technologies (FTTH, DSL, HFC, and PLC) to support the 
static component and the WiMAX technology for mobility; 
or b) use the WiMAX technology to support the Fixed and 
Nomadic component. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Cost model framework [11] 
The Capital Expenses (CAPEX) costs referred above are 
divided into: equipment costs, installation costs, cable costs, 
housing costs and civil works. Besides the annual capital 
costs, which are derived from the relevant values for directly 
and indirectly attributable investments, other costs also need 
to be taken into account, for instance those incurred for the 
network’s operation and maintenance (OPEX -Operational 
Expenses).  
III. SEGMENTED REGULATION 
A. Overview 
One of main goals of regulated access is to prevent the 
incumbent from abusing a dominant market position. It is 
necessary make sure that alternative operators can compete 
effectively. It is fundamental that incumbent operators give 
access to the civil works infrastructure, including its ducts, 
and to give wholesale broadband access (bitstream) to the 
local loop (be it based on copper, new fiber, etc.). However, 
at the same time alternative operators should be able to 
compete on the basis of the wholesale broadband input while 
they progressively rolling out their own NGAN 
infrastructure. In some areas, especially with higher density, 
alternative operators have rolled their own infrastructure and 
broadband competition has developed. This would result in 
more innovation and better prices to consumers. 
Many Europeans incumbents and some alternative 
operators are starting to plan and in some cases deploy large 
scale fiber investments, which results in important changes 
for European fixed line markets [3]. The risk of alternative 
operators will take longer to deploy their own infrastructure 
will give to incumbent the possibility to create new 
monopolies at the access level. The technologies used and 
the pace of development vary from country to country 
according to existing networks and 
local factors. Based on the different 
underlying cost conditions of entry 
and presence of alternative platforms, 
it may be more appropriate to 
geographically differentiate the access 
regulatory regime.  
This part of the work focus the 
development of a tool using c 
language (with multiprocessing ) that 
simulates the impact of retail and 
wholesale prices in provider’s profit, 
welfare, consumer surplus, costs, 
Market served, network size, etc.  
B. Description 
In the proposed model “Retail 
Prices” represents the set of retail 
prices charged by providers for each 
service to consumers in a given 
region/area. We assume that retail 
providers cannot price discriminate in 
the retail market. “Wholesale Prices” 
represents the prices that one provider charges to other 
provider to allow the later to use the infrastructure to reach 
consumers. We assume that wholesale price can be different 
in each area. Also, we assume that when a provider buy 
infrastructure access in the wholesale market, cannot resell to 
another provider. The shared infrastructure consists of (Table 
I): Conduit and collocation facilities; Dark fiber leasing (dark 
fiber requires active equipment to illuminate the fiber – for 
example repeaters); and Bit stream. 
TABLE I.  INFRASTRUCTURE LAYERS (MAIN COMPONENTS) 
 
For example, Wholesaler provider can sell Layer 0 access 
(conduit and collocation facilities) and/or Layer 1 access 
(dark fiber leasing) or Layer 2 access (bitstream – network 
layer unbundling – UNE loop) only to retail providers and 
not directly to consumers. UNE loop is defined as the local 
loop network element that is a transmission facility between 
the central office and the point of demarcation at an end-
user’s premises. 
Providers incur in fixed costs to build network 
infrastructure to provide access to a region and in marginal 
costs to connect each consumer separately. As we can see in 
Figure 4, our tool has several input parameters (one of them 
come from the techno-economic model described in the 
previous section), compute several results and find the 
strategies that are Nash equilibrium. The results are 
represented in tables and graphics.  
Figure 4.  Simulation Tool architecture 
The input parameters can be divided into 7 main groups: 
 Identify the number of providers, regions, services and 
layers. We used layers to represents the shared 
infrastructure (Layer 0 – conduit and collocation 
facilities; Layer 1 – Dark Fiber leasing; and Layer 2 – 
Bitstream).  
 Region parameters: for each region/area we need to 
define the total homes, Avg. Feeder length (central 
office (CO) – aggregate node (AGN)), Distribution 
Length (AGN - End User), and Geographical Area 
Description (Rural, Sub-urban, or Urban). 
 Service parameters: Bandwidth required for each 
Service in the different regions. 
 Willingness to pay for services per Region: Consumers 
have different willingness to pay for each service 
(voice, video and data). So, is necessary the definition 
of the willingness for each region and each service. 
 Providers Retail Prices for the different services. One 
assumption is that consumers always buy one service 
when their willingness to pay is higher than the price at 
which some provider sells service. If there are two or 
more providers, consumers choose the service from the 
provider with the lowest price. If several 
providers have the same price, then we 
use the provider ranking. 
 Providers Wholesale Prices for the 
different layers in the several regions. 
We assume that each part of the 
infrastructure can had different leased 
prices in the each region. 
 Fixed and Marginal costs. These costs 
are computed in the tool presented 
above. The cost model uses the 
parameters defined previous to compute 
the costs. For example: total homes, 
length CO-AGN, length AGN-End User, 
bandwidth required for each Service, etc. 
Based on the several input parameters 
described, our tool computes several results 
(profit, consumer surplus, welfare, market 
served, network size, costs, and revenues) and 
finds the strategies that are Nash equilibriums. 
1) Results  
Next table show the structure of the results correspondent 
to a scenario of 2 providers, 2 retail services, 2 infrastructure 
layers (Layer 0: Conduit; Layer 1: Cable + Equipment) and 3 
regions. Each line is a strategy (We consider a strategy a set 
of retail and wholesale prices) 
TABLE II.  STRATEGIES AND RESULTS (TOOL OUTPUT) 
 
For each combination of prices, the tool computes: Profit, 
Consumer Surplus, Welfare, Market Served, Network Size, 
and Total Costs. The results are presented in several graphics 
(see Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
Figure 5.  Total Profit (Retail Price) 
Figure 6.  Total Consumer Surplus 
2) Nash equilibriums 
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept in the theory 
of games and the most widely used method of predicting the 
outcome of a strategic interaction in the social sciences. A 
game (in strategic or normal form) consists of the following 
three elements: a set of players, a set of actions (or pure-
strategies) available to each player, and a payoff (or utility) 
function for each player. The payoff functions represent each 
player’s preferences over action profiles, where an action 
profile is simply a list of actions, one for each player. A 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an action profile with the 
property that no single player can obtain a higher payoff by 
deviating unilaterally from this profile (International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences – 2nd Edition).  
The next paragraphs explain the algorithm used in our 
work for finding Nash equilibriums - Finding each 
provider’s best response to the other provider’s strategy: 1) 
Select a specific provider and a specific strategy. For 
example, select strategy A from provider 1. 
Next, find the provider 2 best response (column 
4) for the strategy A from provider 1. This means 
that the best response of provider 2 to strategy A 
from provider 1 is 6 (see Figure 7 – step 1). 2) 
For provider 2 select strategy A (the same 
strategy selected in step 1), and find the provider 
1 best response (column 3) for the strategy A 
from provider 2 (see Figure 7 – step 1). 3) 
Repeat step 1 and 2 for strategy B. 4) When we 
finished, we will get the following table. Any 
line with a box in column 3 and 4 is a Nash 
equilibrium. In other words, when both providers 
are playing their best response at the same time, 
that is a Nash equilibrium (provider 1 plays 
strategy B and provider 2 plays strategy B) (see 
Figure 7 – step 3). 
 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
Figure 7.  Finding Nash equilibrium (steps) 
For the scenario presented above, our tool identified the 
combinations that are Nash equilibrium.  
TABLE III.  NASH EQUILIBRIA 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The definition of the access price is a critical question 
when the incumbent also has activity in the retail market. 
Without the access price regulation the operator owner of the 
network can obstruct or hinder the access to the network. 
But, by other side, the exaggerated control of the access price 
can discourage the investments of the incumbent in the 
network quality. The investment in the network quality 
increases the services value to the existent consumers (for 
example: access with higher quality and speed to services 
like e-mail, www, video, etc.) and attracts new consumers.  
So, regulatory authority can use the access prices 
definition to: induce the entrance of new providers in the 
retail market- concurrency in the retail market; incentive to 
investment; and consumer’s welfare. The regulatory 
authorities need to define the max price for wholesale access. 
So, the main decisions are: Decision about the wholesale 
access price for each layer; and Decision about the price for 
each service in retail market. 
The tool pretends support regulatory authorities to 
determine whether it is appropriate to delineate markets more 
narrowly than on a ‘national’ basis, and if so, how they 
should be segmented is a complex task. The experience of 
several OECD countries demonstrates that identifying 
relevant criteria for the definition of geographic markets and 
the segmentation of the market is possible and can be 
effective, but can be complex [2]. It is important that 
regulators accurately determine whether geographically 
segmented regulation is appropriate. When effectively 
implemented, geographic segmentation will promote 
competition and investment and serve the long-term interests 
of end-users. In addition, it may make sense for some 
countries to utilize geographically segmented regulation and 
for others to decline to do so. Also, to the extent that 
different technologies have different geographic footprints, 
the possibility arises that this could lead to distortions if 
different technologies of increasing substitutability (because 
of convergence) are regulated differently under a geographic 
regulation regime. 
It is possible that investment in areas which remain 
regulated (e.g., sparsely populated rural areas) will be 
adversely affected by geographic regulation. This is because 
the incumbent’s priority could become investment in areas 
open to competition to enhance its competitive prowess, and 
this could, in turn, result in competitive operators also 
focusing more attention to these areas rather than in rural 
areas. 
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